DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 277 631 SO 017 828

AUTHOR Lefever, Ernest W., Ed.
TITLE Morality and Foreign Policy. A Symposium on President Carter's Stance.
INSTITUTION Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, DC.
REPORT NO ISBN-0-89633-005-2
PUB DATE 77
NOTE 81p.
AVAILABLE FROM University Press of America, 4720 Boston Way, Lanham, MD 20706 ($7.00).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Collected Works - General (020) -- Books (010)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS *Civil Liberties; Civil Rights; *Democracy; *Ethics; *Foreign Policy; Global Approach; Higher Education; Humanism; International Law; *International Relations; *Moral Values
IDENTIFIERS *Carter Administration

ABSTRACT

This monograph contains a critical examination of President Carter's view on ethics and foreign policy as expressed in his commencement speech at Notre Dame University on May 22, 1977. The book is organized into three parts. Part 1 contains Mr. Carter's speech entitled, "Power for Humane Purposes." Part 2 contains nine responses to the speech: "Reflecting the Eastern Establishment" (Robert L. Bartley); "Confusing Domestic and Foreign Policy" (Ronald Berman); "Selective Invocation of Universal Values" (Jeane Kirkpatrick); "The Valor of Ignorance" (Charles Burton Marshall); "Totalitarianism--the Central Challenge" (Daniel Patrick Moynihan); "The March of Defeat" (Michael Novak); "A Lack of Ideological Roots" (John P. Roche); "Ignoring Soviet Realities" (Eugene V. Rostow); and "Ideals, Maxims, and Deeds" (Roger L. Shinn). Part 3 contains three essays which are not direct comments on the speech but address issues in the debate on ethics and foreign policy: "Morality and Power" (Henry A. Kissinger); "Morality, Liberalism, and Foreign Policy" (Irving Kristol); and "Limits of the Human Rights Standard" (Ernest W. Lefever). The document also contains a selected bibliography. (KL)

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The Ethics and Public Policy Center also publishes a reprint series with essentially the same objective. In both series the authors selected recognize the validity of what we commonly call fundamental Western values and attempt to combine moral reasoning with empirical analysis.

The authors alone are responsible for the views expressed.

Errata:

p. 24, paragraph numbered 6, line 15:

for *Cameroons* read *Cameroon*

p. 27, 2d full paragraph, line 10:

for *Wililam* read *William*

p. 41, line 6:

for *totalitarianism* read *totalitarian*

p. 47, footnote:

Mr. Rostow is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger

p. 55, next to last paragraph, line 4:

delete *he* after *happily*

p. 64, 3d line from bottom:

for *Comunist* read *Communist*

p. 76, fourth bibliography entry should read:

Marshall, Charles Burton. *The Limits of Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, enlarged edition, 1968.

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Printed in the United States of America.
ISBN 0-89633-005-2
Library of Congress catalogue card number 77-92745

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Preface

President Jimmy Carter, perhaps more than any other president since Woodrow Wilson, has sought to make morality the touchstone of his foreign policy. In so doing he draws upon a persistent and fundamental strand in the American experience. He has emphasized respect for human rights throughout the world, not only as a valued goal, but also as a specific objective of U.S. statecraft.

Mr. Carter's view on ethics and foreign policy have drawn considerable comment, favorable and unfavorable, here and abroad, but so far they have received little systematic analysis. This monograph, the first to be published by the Ethics and Public Policy Center, is offered as a critical examination of his views.

The President expressed his basic approach to foreign policy in a commencement address delivered at Notre Dame University on May 22, 1977, in which he sought to "connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation." The symposium opens with this speech. Fifteen American observers of foreign policy were invited to comment briefly on it, and the essays of the nine who responded form the body of the book.

Also included are three other essays which, while they are not direct comments on the Notre Dame speech, are addressed to issues in the current debate on ethics and foreign policy. These previously published essays were written by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Irving Kristol, and the editor.

E.W.L.

Washington, D.C.
November 1977

PART ONE

President Jimmy Carter

Power for Humane Purposes

JIMMY CARTER

In his twenty-five years as president of Notre Dame, Father Hesburgh has spoken more consistently and more effectively in the support of the rights of human beings than any other person I know. His interest in the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights has never wavered, and he played an important role in broadening the scope of the Center's work—and I have visited there last fall to see this work—to include now all people in the world, as shown by last month's conference here on human rights and American foreign policy.

And that concern has been demonstrated again today in a vivid fashion by the selection of Bishop Donal Lamont, Paul Cardinal Arns, and Stephen Cardinal Kim, to receive honorary degrees. In their fight for human freedoms in Rhodesia, Brazil, and South Korea, these three religious leaders typify all that is best in their countries and in our church. I am honored to join you in recognizing their dedication and their personal sacrifice and their supreme courage.

Quite often, brave men like these are castigated and sometimes punished, sometimes even put to death, because they enter the realm where human rights is a struggle, and sometimes they are blamed for the very circumstance which they helped dramatize. But it has been there for a long time, and the flames which

they seek to extinguish concern us all and are increasingly visible around the world.

Last week, I spoke in California about the domestic agenda for our nation to provide more efficiently for the needs of our people, to demonstrate—against the dark faith of our times—that our government can be both competent and more humane.

But I want to speak to you today about the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation. I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence which we have for humane purposes. We can also have a foreign policy that the American people both support and for a change know about and understand.

I have a quiet confidence in our own political system. Because we know that democracy works, we can reject the arguments of those rulers who deny human rights to their people. We are confident that democracy's example will be compelling, and so we seek to bring that example closer to those from whom in the past few years we have been separated and who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind of life.

We are confident that democratic methods are the most effective, and so we are not tempted to employ improper tactics here at home or abroad.

We are confident of our own strength, so we can seek substantial mutual reductions in the nuclear arms race.

And we are confident of a good sense of the American people, and so we let them share in the process of making foreign policy decisions. We can thus speak with the voices of 215 million, and not just of an isolated handful.

Democracy's great recent success—in India, Portugal, Spain, Greece—show that our confidence in this system is not misplaced. Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I am glad that that is being changed.

For too many years, we have been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We have fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and

moral poverty. But through failure, we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence.

By the measure of history, our nation's 200 years are very brief, and our rise to world eminence is briefer still. It dates from 1945, when Europe and the old international order lay in ruins. Before then America was largely on the periphery of world affairs, but since then we have inescapably been at the center of world affairs.

Our policy during this period was guided by two principles—a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable but must be contained, and the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic. That system could not last forever unchanged. Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive even though the competition has become more extensive.

The Vietnamese war produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our own leaders.

In less than a generation we have seen the world change dramatically. The daily lives and aspirations of most human beings have been transformed. Colonialism has nearly gone. A new sense of national identity now exists in almost 100 new countries that have been formed in the last generation. Knowledge has become more widespread, aspirations are higher.

As more people have been freed from traditional constraints, more have been determined to achieve for the first time in their lives social justice.

The world is still divided by ideological disputes dominated by regional conflicts and threatened by danger that we will not resolve the differences of race and wealth without violence or without drawing into combat the major military powers. We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity and human rights.

It is a new world—but America should not fear it. It is a new world—and we should help to shape it. It is a new world

that calls for a new American foreign policy—a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in its historical vision.

We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the new reality of a politically awakening world.

We can no longer expect that the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful, but we must continue—confidently—our efforts to inspire, and to persuade, and to lead.

Our policy must reflect our belief that the world can hope for more than simple survival, and our belief that dignity and freedom are man's fundamental spiritual requirements. Our policy must shape an international system that will last longer than secret deals.

We cannot make this kind of policy by manipulation. Our policy must be open and candid; it must be one of constructive global involvement, resting on these five cardinal premises.

I have tried to make these premises clear to the American people since last January. Let me review what we have been doing and discuss what we intend to do.

First, we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural background, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has ever known. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our nation stands for more than financial prosperity.

This does not mean that we can conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect and will always be imperfect—a world that is complex and confused, and which will always be complex and confused.

I understand fully the limits of moral suasion. We have no illusion that changes will come easily or soon. But I also believe that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. In our own history, that power has ranged from Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, "I Have a Dream."

In the life of the human spirit, words are action, much more so than many of us may realize who live in countries where

freedom of expression is taken for granted. The leaders of totalitarian countries understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted.

Nonetheless, we can already see dramatic worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state. For us to ignore this trend would be to lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to regain the moral stature we once had.

The great democracies are not free because we are strong and prosperous. I believe we are strong and influential and prosperous because we are free.

Throughout the world today in free nations and in totalitarian countries as well, there is a preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights, and I believe it is incumbent on us in this country to keep that discussion, that debate, that contention alive. No other country is as well qualified as we to set an example. We have our own shortcomings and faults, and we should strive constantly and with courage to make sure we are legitimately proud of what we have.

Second, we have moved deliberately to reinforce the bonds among our democracies. In our recent meetings in London, we agreed to widen our economic cooperation; to promote free trade; to strengthen the world's monetary system; to seek ways of avoiding nuclear proliferation. We prepared constructive proposals for the forthcoming meetings on North-South problems of poverty, development, and global well-being; and we agreed on joint efforts to reinforce and modernize our common defense.

You may be interested in knowing that at this NATO meeting for the first time in more than twenty-five years all members are democracies. Even more important, all of us reaffirmed our basic optimism in the future of the democratic system. Our spirit of confidence is spreading. Together, our democracies can help to shape the wider architecture of global cooperation.

Third, we have moved to engage the Soviet Union in a joint effort to halt the strategic arms race. That race is not only dangerous, it is morally deplorable. We must put an end to it.

I know it will not be easy to reach agreements. Our goal is to be fair to both sides, to produce reciprocal stability, parity, and security. We desire a freeze on further modernization and con-

tinuing substantial reductions of strategic weapons as well. We want a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, a prohibition against chemical warfare, no attack capability against space satellites, and arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

I hope that we can take joint steps with all nations toward eliminating nuclear weapons completely from our arsenals of death. We will persist in this effort.

Now, I believe in détente with the Soviet Union. To me, it means progress towards peace. But the effects of détente should not be limited to our own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state's military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola.

Cooperation also implies obligation. We hope that the Soviet Union will join with us in playing a larger role in aiding the developing world, for common aid efforts will help us build a bridge of mutual confidence in one another.

Fourth, we are taking deliberate steps to improve the chances of lasting peace in the Middle East. Through wide-ranging consultations with the leaders of the countries involved—Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—we have found some areas of agreement and some movement toward consensus. The negotiations must continue.

Through my own public comments, I have also tried to suggest a more flexible framework for the discussion of the three key issues which have so far been intractable: the nature of a comprehensive peace—What is peace? What does it mean to the Israelis? What does it mean to the Arab nations?

Secondly, the relationship between security and borders—how can the dispute over border deliberations be established and settled with a feeling of security on both sides? And the issue of the Palestinian homeland.

The historic friendship between the United States and Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in either nation; it is derived from our common respect for human freedom and from our common search for permanent peace. We will continue to promote a settlement which all of us need.

Our own policy will not be affected by changes in leadership in any of the countries in the Middle East. Therefore, we expect

Israel and her neighbors to continue to be bound by UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which they have previously accepted.

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost thirty years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean disaster, not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well.

Fifth, we are attempting, even at the risk of some friction with our friends, to reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation and the worldwide spread of conventional weapons.

At the recent summit we set in motion an international effort to determine the best ways of harnessing energy for peaceful use while reducing the risk that its products will be diverted to the making of explosives.

We will, as a matter of national policy now in our country, seek to reduce the annual dollar volume of arms sales, to restrict the transfer of advanced weapons and to reduce the extent of our coproduction arrangements about weapons with foreign states.

And just as important, we are trying to get other nations, both free and otherwise, to join us in this effort.

But all of this that I have described is just the beginning. It is a beginning aimed toward a clear goal, to create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new and rapidly changing historical circumstances.

We will cooperate more closely with the newly influential countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. We need their friendship and cooperation in a common effort as the structure of the world changes.

More than a hundred years ago Abraham Lincoln said our nation could not exist half slave and half free. We know a peaceful world cannot long exist one third rich and two thirds hungry.

Most nations share our faith that in the long run, expanded and equitable trade will best help the developing countries to help themselves. But the immediate problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and repression are here now.

The Western democracies, the OPEC nations, and the developed Communist countries can cooperate through existing international institutions in providing more effective aid. This is an excellent alternative to war.

We have a special need for cooperation and consultation with other nations in this hemisphere, to the North and to the South. We do not need another slogan; although these are our close friends and neighbors, our relationships with them are the same links of equity that we forge for the rest of the world. We will be dealing with them as part of a new worldwide mosaic of global, regional, and bilateral relations.

It is important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China. We see the American-Chinese relationship as a central element of our global policy and China as a key force for global peace. We wish to cooperate closely with the creative Chinese people on the problems that confront all mankind, and we hope to find a formula which can bridge some of the difficulties that still separate us.

Finally, let me say that we are committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Southern Africa. The time has come for the principle of majority rule to be the basis for political order, recognizing that in a democratic system the rights of the minority must also be protected.

To be peaceful, change must come promptly. The United States is determined to work together with our European allies and with the concerned African states to shape a congenial international framework for the rapid and progressive transformation of Southern African society and to help protect it from unwarranted outside interference.

Let me conclude by summarizing: Our policy is based on an historical vision of America's role. Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change. Our policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind.

It is a policy that I hope will make you proud to be Americans.

PART TWO

Nine Responses

Reflecting the Eastern Establishment

ROBERT L. BARTLEY

Almost certainly it is a mistake to look to President Carter's professed morality to explain our concerns about his foreign policy. His version of morality is not that sharp a departure, and on experience so far not that powerful a force in shaping his policies. We would do better to worry about sheer inexperience. Or about an engineer's habit of mind, likely to conclude that the best foreign policy, like the best bridge, will be designed and built by the people with the best formal credentials. The mistakes of his administration are likely not to be the exotic mistakes of a born-again Baptist, but the familiar mistakes of the Eastern foreign-policy establishment.

Moralistic strains are nothing new, after all, to American experience or American foreign policy. Surely they reach back at least to John Winthrop's proclamation of "a city upon a hill." Washington's advice against "entangling alliances" certainly served the national interest, but spoke no little moralism. America was to be above the sordid affairs of Europe. In our century this version of moral purity remained strong enough to prevail in the battle over the League of Nations, a clash of two moral

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Robert L. Bartley, a veteran journalist, has been with the Wall Street Journal *for fifteen years. Since 1972 he has been editor of the editorial page.*

visions. Wilson's desire to make the world "safe for democracy" re-emerged in the Second World War. The U.S. pressure for decolonization after the war has to be understood not as a matter of narrow interest but as a reflection of the moral concern over the American civil rights problem. The righteousness of John Foster Dulles was notorious. In Vietnam, the Pentagon whiz kids set out to "win the hearts and minds of the people."

Jimmy Carter did not invent morality in American foreign policy. It has been there from the first. It has been invoked on all sides of the argument, for good purposes and bad. The question is not how Mr. Carter's concern with morality will change the pressures of *Realpolitik*. The question is, whose morality is it this time, and to what purposes will it be put?

In this respect, the surprising thing about the outline of morality that President Carter put forth at Notre Dame last May is not how different but how derivative. Its claim to innovation lay solely in the matter of human rights, the complexities of which can be put aside for a few moments. The rest is no new morality; it is the conventional wisdom. It is the morality of the elite universities, the national media, the opinion-forming strata, the American establishment.

Vietnam proves the "intellectual and moral poverty" of "fighting fire with fire." "A peaceful world cannot long exist one third rich and two thirds hungry." We must make progress in "normalizing" relations with the People's Republic of China. We must cement the bonds among the democracies, solve the problems of the Middle East, join with the Soviet Union to stop the "dangerous" and "morally deplorable" strategic arms "race." We must halt the danger of nuclear proliferation and the worldwide spread of conventional weapons—all familiar ideas, not in the pulpits of Plains or Atlanta, but in the salons of Georgetown and Cambridge.

On the problem of Southern Africa, Mr. Carter's own experience may particularly amplify the conventional wisdom. At least, it is hard to imagine Eastern foreign-policy sophisticates saying that the "peaceful resolution" of the problem lies in "majority rule to be the basis for political order," but that "in a democratic system the rights of the minority must be protected." These words have relevance for Atlanta of 1954, but they have nothing to do with the tragic reality of Southern

Africa in 1977. But when Mr. Carter calls for the "rapid and progressive transformation" of society there and the need to "protect it from unwarranted outside interference," there can be little doubt that he will be against the white racists and on the side of the black dictators. While the rhetoric may be a bit gauche, the prescription remains the establishment one.

Now, the recent prescriptions of the foreign policy establishment do have something to do with morality, but this new morality is far from a resurgence of innocent Wilsonianism. Wilson had a conception of American mission. He agreed with Washington about our moral superiority to the sordid Europeans; he wanted to give the world the benefit of our experience. This was disagreeable and disruptive, but it is infinitely healthier than a moral conception built around a deep sense of American guilt.

This conception of American guilt is the *moral* foundation of the policy of withdrawal Mr. Carter is gravitating toward from Panama to Panmunjom. To be sure, the basis for these policies is not merely morality. A large part of it is sheer fear. Another part is the desire of the State Department to please its clients, which are the foreign governments, not that of the United States. But to the extent that there is a moral content, it is this: we have failed to win "the hearts and minds of the people." In particular, the prescriptions of the Eastern foreign-policy establishment have failed. Since the prescriptions of that establishment will clearly be the best intellectually, the failure must be moral. We can only atone by placating whoever may raise demands against us.

Which brings us to human rights. It is here and here alone that Mr. Carter has projected something other than the conventional morality. With the human rights issue Mr. Carter has dared affront the Kremlin! He has not merely angered certain foreigners: He has challenged the Russians.

And in doing so Mr. Carter has told the American people that their civilization stands for something after all. A society that upholds freedom of speech and freedom from torture need not feel too guilty in today's world. These are values worth defending.

And yet, we wait to see how the human-rights issue works itself out, for it, too, can be used as a pretext for sponsoring

American guilt, for American withdrawal. Father Hesberg's Notre Dame gives honorary degrees to Catholic bishops fighting repression in Rhodesia, Brazil, and South Korea. It cannot find comparable defenders of human freedom in North Vietnam, Poland, or Uganda. It charts the easy route on human rights, and on this issue too the establishment may in the end have its way with Mr. Carter.

Confusing Domestic and Foreign Policy

RONALD BERMAN

In the three centuries or so since Sir Henry Wotton defined an ambassador as a man sent abroad to lie for his country a fairly perceptible idea of foreign relations has evolved. Its language differs from that we ordinarily use in being more courteous and less truthful than people would ordinarily stand for. But it is a useful language, whether addressed to cannibals, Communists, or people very much like ourselves. The language of diplomacy is formal, unwilling to commit, full of traditional ways of preventing opposing interests from finding in the very words they use yet one more difference between them. In the very difficult period of foreign relations since the Korea action we have come to recognize, at Paris and at Panmunjom, that our adversaries take the keenest and most subtle interest in the language of policy and negotiation.

The language of diplomacy is cold and lucid, but not immoral. It tries to begin statement or negotiation from neutral ground. It tries above all not to create problems of misinterpretation. The President's speech at Notre Dame is in another kind of

Ronald Berman, until 1977 chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, is now a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. He is the author of America in the Sixties: An Intellectual History.

language. It speaks in terms of morality, which history tells us must be sublimated before any real policy can be enacted. This speech asks of the hearer what is really inappropriate: that he be optimistic, that he be righteous, and that he judge his and the nation's actions pretty much by intentions. What it says is that we are to be judged by the morality we bring to any bargaining table. That is fundamentally undiplomatic, and not a little Pharisaic: the reason of course being that morality rightly judges what we accomplish by negotiation. As Hannah Arendt once reminded us, morality is action, not a state of mind.

The language of this speech is heavily weighted in favor of values, inspiration, vision, and dozens of other words that have to do with moral uplift, or with *feelings about morality*. Ordinarily, one would suppose this to be harmless in political statement. But this speech uses "moral" qualities to criticize other qualities, among them the work of the conscious mind. Mr. Carter's speechwriters ask us to take for granted things about ourselves and other people that normally excite considerable differences of opinion. When it is suggested, for example, that our previous foreign policy was based upon fear, greed, and ignorance, then a whole generation of strategy—much of it wise and, if I may say so, moral—is written off. The work of that generation, from Acheson to Kissinger, becomes the expression of moral failure. Is this language meant to suggest to Russia, China, or ourselves that we now repudiate that strategy? It looks that way.

Where the language of this speech is moralistic it tends to have an effect just about opposite to that intended: By devaluing our past motives it makes our present ones suspicious. How reliable can policy be which is based upon the acceptance of our moral fallibility? Even worse, it causes tremendous and I think unresolvable conflict between the expectations held by our adversaries, who do not use this language themselves, and our own expectations about foreign affairs, which this language is incapable of stating.

Where this language is conceptual it is simply, plainly, and often wrong. It assumes, for example, that higher aspirations proceed from the loss of traditional "constraints" (it is hard to tell from the context whether these include cultural beliefs and

structures) and lead to the universal desire for social justice. Nothing since the writings of Emile Durkheim has remotely suggested this. Instead, the study of society suggests that high aspirations are almost never produced by the loss of anything traditional. As for social justice, there is much less of that abroad than is suggested. There are now fewer democratic governments in the world, and more tribal, regional, and national oppositions among those nations saluted by the President. There is now taken for granted in former colonial states the infringement of the rights of adversaries, including, of course, adversary minorities.

In relation to these facts the speech works more by suggestion than anything else, beginning with the virtues of a moral attitude, praising what it is about to do, and concluding that there are now more customers than ever for its services.

Moralism tends to elide the differences between separate realms of human activity and interest. In Mr. Carter's case there is what seems to be a planned confusion between domestic and foreign policy. The rest of the world is depicted as if it were an American constituency, driven by our own motives, vulnerable to our own rhetoric. One of the reasons why nations do not "communicate"—which is to say why they do not have intuitive understanding of each other, or habitual and unstated ways of drawing inferences from behavior—is that they speak different conceptual languages. The foreign auditors of this speech will have very little to go on for its interpretation, and they may understandably conclude that we either dislike ourselves or are hypocritical about ourselves.

It may be, of course, that the speech is aimed only at a national audience. If the American audience is the only one intended then the language of this speech becomes comprehensible. It is a kind of domestic pep talk, trailing behind it the oratory of the campaign, certainly of the civil rights movement, and the most familiar of the strains of the social gospel, our self-improvement. The emphasis on social ideals and spiritual values has probably not been matched since the equally value-stricken words of John Foster Dulles and, before him, of Woodrow Wilson. That being the case, its foreign auditors have a good deal to worry about. They are bound to interpret it as another example of devious-

ness, since, in their experience, nothing is more likely to spring from the language of moralism than acts of self-interest justified by its values.

In short, whatever policy is expressed by this speech is undercut by its language.

Selective Invocation of Universal Values

JEANE KIRKPATRICK

President Carter's emphasis on human rights and his assertion of its irreducible role in American foreign policy seem to me a good thing mainly because they remind us and the rest of the world that this nation's identity and purposes are deeply involved with the assertion of universal human rights. Totalitarian parties and governments have so often tagged us the leading capitalist imperialist colonial power that we may, ourselves, find it hard to remember that the first settlers, in fact, came seeking religious freedom and espousing a political philosophy that linked legitimacy to consent. It may also be hard to remember that Americans pioneered the development of government limited by law, popular accountability, and natural rights.

Candidate Carter's emphasis on these themes was rewarding to people sick to death of having their motives, characters, and policies excoriated. For a long decade, the New Left seemed almost to have pre-empted the moral perspective on political events—foreign and domestic—not because successive administrations had embraced *Realpolitik* but because (for various rea-

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sons) our leaders preferred to explain their policies in cool rhetoric while critics delivered moral judgments in less measured, more excited voices. One important consequence of Carter's re-emphasis of human rights has been to break the antiestablishment monopoly on moral rhetoric. Another has been to reassure Americans and others that U.S. policy is guided by a vision of the public good. A third important effect of the human rights campaign has been to affirm a moral principle which needs continuing reaffirmation: that there are universal moral rights that men as men (and women as women) are entitled to and that these ought to be respected by governments. Though aware of the pitfalls of conceiving of foreign policy as a crusade, I am convinced that people and governments cannot live on pragmatism and profits alone—however enlightened the former or fulsome the latter. It seems likely that the decreasing frequency in a political system of appeals to conscience signals the erosion of moral consensus and also contributes to it. Since democracies have an especially great need for moral consensus, continuing appeals to conscience are both restorative and stabilizing. For having recalled Americans (and others) to historic moral imperatives and for having placed individual rights back on the international agenda President Carter wins my applause. This accomplishment seems to me more important than my misgivings about specific applications of the policy.

It should therefore be clear that my comments on the Notre Dame speech do not reflect generalized disapproval of the administration's foreign policy. My comments are directed only to that speech, which seems to me a particularly poor one. My doubts and puzzlements can perhaps best be expressed by way of the following questions.

1. Why is the President "confident that democracies' examples will be compelling" when history so clearly establishes that democratic governments are both rare and difficult to establish. It is true that developments in Portugal, Spain, and Greece testify to the continuing power of the democratic idea and illustrate the possibilities of building democratic institutions on the ruins of traditional autocracies. But each of these happy cases also demonstrates the perils and problems that confront efforts to construct governments limited by law, based on majority rule, and guaranteeing political competition and respect for minority

rights. The less happy experiences of many nations in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa illustrate how much easier it is to establish autocracies than viable democracies. One may *hope* that the example of freedom provided by the Western democracies will reinforce the human appetite for liberty, but there hardly seem to be adequate grounds for confidence that their example will prove compelling.

2. Why is the arms race "morally deplorable"? Does the President mean that it is intrinsically immoral to spend money on weapons—regardless of the context? Doesn't the moral quality of an arms race depend on the consequences for specified populations of arming and not arming?

3. Why does the President think that "a peaceful world cannot exist one third rich and two thirds hungry"? The implication is that the frustration of poor nations causes war. In fact, the notion that poverty causes war doesn't wash. Poverty causes hardship, suffering, and death among men, women, and children but there is little evidence to support the notion that it causes war. The Second World War, to take a single example, was not caused by hungry peoples seeking food, but by a rich country seeking living room. Instead of attacking rich states, poor states fight with poor states, while rich states fight with each other. The fighting in Chad, Zaire, Ethiopia, the Sahara, Angola, and Uganda (to choose some conflicts almost at random) remind us of the many noneconomic causes of war. Poverty does not make poor states indifferent to power and status, any more than wealth makes rich states indifferent to power and status. Poverty is abominable, not because it leads to war, but because it perpetuates human misery. We can approach problems of war and poverty more effectively if we are clear about the relationships between them.

4. A related question: Why does the President think that "we can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights"?

As most wars are not caused by poverty or hunger, neither are they caused by breaches of "justice, equity, and human rights." Why does the President assert the contrary? Is he prepared to make observance of justice, equity, and human rights a condition of war and peace? Is he suggesting that this nation will or

should go to war over such matters? Or that we can achieve peace only with states whose practices meet our standards of justice, equity, and human rights, or that the world will be at peace only if all states achieve justice, equity, and human rights, or what?

5. Why is it "important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China"? Is it because the President desires us to have full diplomatic relations with all countries or with all Communist countries? And if so, why? Is that more important than demonstrating the fidelity of our commitments? How would American economic and military interests be better served if we had an ambassador in Peking in place of a high-level representative without the title? Does the President believe that the future of the Sino-Soviet split depends on the title of the American emissary or that the "creative Chinese people" will cease to trade with the United States as long as we have goods and technology they desire?

6. Why, of all African states—or of all states in the world—has the President decided that Southern Africa is *the* place in which the "time has come" for a political system based on majority rule and minority rights? I do not doubt the President's sincerity in advocating a democratic system in Rhodesia, South West Africa, and South Africa; I do not believe that he means "black rule" when he says "majority rule" or that he covertly desires to replace white oligarchies with black dictators. But if a white oligarchy does not seem to him more obnoxious than a black dictatorship, on what principle does the President decide that it is more important to establish majority rule and minority rights in Southern Africa than, say, in Uganda, or Tanzania, or Zaire, or Togo, or Ghana, or Nigeria, or Benin, or Kenya, or Guinea Bissau, or Niger, Upper Volta, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Camaroons, Mozambique, or Angola? Or for that matter, how does he decide that it is more important to have majority rule and minority rights in Southern Africa than in, say, Cuba, Cambodia, North Korea, the Soviet Union, or than in Chile, Paraguay, or Panama?

The very question testifies to the difficulties encountered when a government attempts to invoke universal moral rules as the justification for a policy which will necessarily be selectively applied. Obviously, the President and his advisers need to move

beyond the invocation of universal values and general principles to the knotty business of applying them in this notoriously imperfect, intractable world.

The Notre Dame speech does not constitute progress in this task. Probably, however, we should not attach much significance to that pronouncement. A speech is only a speech. And commencement speeches, particularly, are thought to require high-flown statements of principle, dedication, and optimism. I take comfort from the President's reputation for cool appraisal as well as high purpose. I trust it will save him and us from the confusions and clichés so apparent in the Notre Dame speech.

"The Valor of Ignorance"

CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL

The man is now confirmed at the apex of authority by election —an impulsion satisfied, a life's goal achieved. His political skills are renowned within the accustomed range, but now with the advent of spring it is time to demonstrate talents of cosmopolitan scope—to pronounce a world view and to elicit across the nation and beyond support for large undertakings abroad. For a setting the President chooses a distinguished university. By charitable appraisal the speech is grade-B—no threat to Lincoln's or even Wilson's laurels. Yet it contains important clues. In their hackneyed way, the themes draw upon expansive visions and vaulting dreams. With assurance born of having a fresh mandate and of starting from square one, the President is trying to think big. With all its tenacious ills, the great globe is portrayed as malleable into shapes to fit our hearts' desire by energetic endeavors reflecting our inherent national virtues. Implicitly the President is secure in a belief of having remedial powers of personality. Such a type, with self-confidence in surplus, will need a lot of cautionary advice. One's impression is

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of a President with much to learn and unlearn about the vast external realm.

The words above, originally drafted for a commentary on Lyndon Johnson's speech at Baltimore in 1965, will do for Jimmy Carter's at South Bend a dozen troubled years later, for the two utterances are much alike in premises, expectations, and style. Either text prompts one to ask, quoting Irving Kristol, "What is it about our political condition that constrains our leaders to define politics as the pursuit of impossible dreams?" In the earlier instance my published presentments about getting policy into a pickle in Southeast Asia anticipated only dimly how harsh a teacher experience would turn out to be for President Johnson. As for President Carter—congenial as he is with the nation's "optimism in its historical vision" and so "confident that democracy's example will be compelling"—I can only wish him the portion of perspicacity or, in lieu of it, luck to forestall occasions for similar unsparing instruction on the limitations of power and the obduracy of external realities.

A portion of bull is typical in presidential speeches. Usually the texts are assembled from snippets of diverse authorship, and bits of overwrought rhetoric may slip by. As expected, seams and exaggerations show in the Carter text. Astonishingly, one finds the head of a tinker-prone administration saying in a speech replete with proposals for regulating one thing and another around the world, "From free and open competition comes creative change—in politics, commerce, science and the arts. From control comes conformity and despair." That outright thought—an echo from Herbert Spencer or perhaps Wililam Graham Sumner—can be dismissed as an inadvertency. The consistencies are more to the point. Sunshine and aspiration are the pervasive moods.

The President's declaration descrying "dramatic worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state," taken at face value, seems encouraging, but "worldwide" expresses a huge compass. One wishes to know the data base, and one wonders what the score is in respect to protecting institutions against wayward individuals. My skepticism concerning—in the President's phrase—"America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy" rises from broader considerations. According to Andrew

Young's *Playboy* interview, the notion of making a big thing on that score came to the Carter camp more by impulse and intuition than on reflection and analysis—a matter for regret, I think, for time and thought might have served well. Some counterpart to Voltaire's prayer to be spared temptation to confess others' sins applies in external relations. To say this is not to decry human rights. By analogy, one might favor conjugal fidelity and yet be loath to harangue straying colleagues or maintain a neighborhood scoreboard about the matter. In practice this government must become choosy, pragmatic, and fitful in its censures—a point already becoming clear—and thereby it will reduce the asserted commitment to a mere occasional expedient. I anticipate a gradual de-emphasis and then a fadeout for this aspect of the Carter foreign policy.

Euphoric zeal is in evidence in relation to the Middle East. The central problem of the area is traceable back to events recounted in Genesis 21. A settlement there in an authentic sense would require of the concerned governments mutual concessions beyond their internal power to give, even if their willingness otherwise were sufficient. So why the hurry to get that situation tidied up once and for all this year at risk of heightening divergencies and incurring renewed hostilities? The administration will be lucky if its "deliberate steps to improve the chances of lasting peace" do not produce effects entirely at variance with the intent.

Southern Africa occurs next on my list of misgivings—a difficult area on which to comment because the intensity of people's convictions about the issues and what should be done about them tends to be inverse to their familiarity with the scene. The approach of the Carter administration as portrayed at Notre Dame reminds me of the late Homer Lea's phrase, "the valor of ignorance." I should advise any inquirer desirous of learning about the problems of the region and feasible solutions—and of how to stay out of perplexities at least as baffling as Vietnam—*not* to start with the President's remarks but rather to read former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball's sage article in *Atlantic* "Asking for Trouble in South Africa" (October 1977, pp. 43–51). It is apt reading also for those described by Ball as "hitherto chairborne mariners . . . just growing familiar with the controls of the ship of state and . . . still exhilarated by the

dramatic results they can achieve by pushing the levers." Ball inveighs against precisely what the Carter administration tends to do—namely, to interpret the problems of the region by simplistic analogy to the U.S. civil-rights movement and to put its issues "at the service of our domestic politics."

I anticipate early U-turns, as reluctant concessions to reality, in the restrictive courses laid out in regard to transfers of arms and nuclear technology. The President's professed purpose of bringing about agreed-upon demilitarization of the Indian Ocean area stirs up doubts concerning not merely the timeliness but indeed the inherent feasibility of the proposition. How can such a condition be achieved in a substantial sense, as distinguished from a nominal sense, for a region entirely within reach of the other side's air power and beyond ours? On the problems of strategy in a larger frame, the President's observations on the "goal to be fair to both sides, to produce reciprocal stability, parity, and security" by compact in the SALT process with the Soviet Union are unexceptionable. Yet a lesson looms ahead, and one must hope that the President will be amenable to it as it emerges into fuller view. The course of patience and prudence which he prescribes will no more deliver us a contract assuring a nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union than regulating the dimensions of football can guarantee every team a season of ties. SALT may set gross limits on superpower strategic competition but cannot bring an end to it. According to the Soviet view, there must be winners and losers in strategic relations as in the integrally related arena of world politics. No end of presidential disquisitions looking to the bright side of things can dispose of the implications of that view for the United States. It must be up to us to preserve strategic balance—not vice versa.

My closing thought pertains to atmospherics rather than substance. A version of the born-again bit, applied to foreign policy, appears in the Notre Dame speech. The nation is portrayed as in a process of emerging from a bad old past into a good new future. It has renounced "moral poverty" in favor of revivifying "our own principles and values." We are said to be casting off "inordinate fear of Communism" and renewing confidence in ourselves, and learning how to fight fire with water instead of fighting it with fire—whatever the relevance of that obscure metaphor may be. For me, just a little of that sort of theme

is too much—not a case of my being against virtue so much as preferring it to be less ostentatious and not greased with unction.

Perhaps an analogy to what has happened to the administration in another aspect—I refer to standards of character for staffing the Carter entourage—is applicable. To skip the details—a principal government official appointed by Carter was revealed to have a degree of cupidity. I do not discount the import of that discovery, for as Herbert Butterfield once observed in another connection, "A civilization may be wrecked without any spectacular crimes or criminals but by constant petty breaches of faith and minor complicities on the part of men generally considered very nice people." I question, however, Anthony Lewis's characteristically feverish view expressed in *The New York Times:* "In the long run, and probably not very long, the result will be to swell the public cynicism that many of us believed Jimmy Carter would reduce." My expectations are more sanguine.

Many commentators have suggested a probable reduction of the piety portion in the Carter administration's self-portrayals in consequence of the imbroglio referred to. Such a development would be salubrious in tendency. I do not see why any swelling of public cynicism should result. Rather, one should hope for a renewal of skepticism. The distinction is important. A cynic shrugs off differences between right and wrong as merely conventional—a sham, as it were. A skeptic acknowledges such differences as real, but regards them to be often complex and subtle, and refuses to arrive at judgments on the basis of declaratory evidence only. Cynicism goes hand in hand with ennui. Skepticism kindles the critical spirit. Every one of us should be skeptical about foreign policy, because that attitude is what helps exact proper performance from those conducting it.

One can hope. Sooner or later events will demonstrate even to the tight inner circle that the Carter administration no more knows the secret for walking on water around the world than it has a formula for cleansing the public service or any other manifestation of the Old Adam. The self-enthrallment then will cease.

Heaven on earth can wait a while. The administration's urgent task is not to effect—in a phrase quoted from another White House attendant, Zbigniew Brzezinski—a "commitment to the

promotion of constructive change, worldwide." Necessity imposes a humbler duty. The constructive change immediately called for is the establishment of coherence. Clarity must begin at home. A renewal of the critical spirit among us all should stimulate the White House to shape up. That edifying turn—getting a demonstrably better grasp on the job—will contribute to renewing general confidence in the conduct of foreign policy. Such renewal is a necessary prelude to what needs to be done to restore the executive's proper power, seriously depreciated in the sequel to the Vietnam debacle, for conducting foreign policy under more modest canons as an art of the possible.

Totalitarianism—the Central Challenge

DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

In his great First Inaugural Address Jefferson, sensing the onset of an era of good feeling, made that famous statement: "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists."

A mood very like this seems to have settled onto the nation in many political matters, not least that of foreign policy. Within this decade disputes over foreign policy raged in the halls of Congress and on the streets of Washington, to the farthest reaches of the land and nowhere with more intensity than on our nation's campuses. Now of a sudden, all is calm. Peace has returned to the campuses, and so have our presidents. Not since the presidency of John F. Kennedy has initiative in these matters been so wholly with the executive.

Recalling that neither the administration of Jefferson nor that of Kennedy led to anything remotely like an era of good feeling, but to the contrary produced the most bitter divisions over foreign policy, it might be well to approach the current consensus with a measure of caution. This is a rare moment

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and a precious one. A structure of domestic peace no less than one of international peace could well emerge from this period. All the more do those of us who would wish to see it endure have the responsibility to put some pressure on the ideas involved to make sure the structure is sound.

Eight years ago, at a very different time, it fell to me to give the commencement address at the University of Notre Dame. It will recall the temper of the times if I tell you I published it in *The American Scholar* under the title "Politics as the Art of the Impossible." Further, that I took as my theme a sentence from the French theologian Georges Bernanos: "The worst, the most corrupting, lies are problems poorly stated."

In a spirit of respect and affection, I would like to put this test to some of the principal themes of President Carter's recent commencement address at Notre Dame, which was devoted to the subject of foreign policy. It was a major address, his first comprehensive statement of the administration's views, and it has been the subject of wide comment. It was, TRB writes in *The New Republic*, "a 'we-love-everybody' kind of speech . . . but its sincerity and idealism rang true."

Surely most of us yield willingly to the President's "reaffirmation," as TRB put it. In listing the basic premises of American policy, he declared, "First, we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy."

This is everything I could hope to hear from an American president. It is what I tried to stand for at the United Nations when I served President Ford. It is what I and others wrote into last year's Democratic platform, on which the President ran for office.

But the matter cannot stop there. The next question is what this commitment requires of us, and where. Here the President leads where I for one would not wish to follow—and I genuinely wonder whether he fully intends what he plainly proposes. The central thrust of his speech has to do with the developing world, and its central proposition as follows: "Abraham Lincoln said that our nation could not exist half slave and half free. We know that a peaceful world cannot long exist one third rich and two thirds hungry."

This is a most startling and extraordinary transition. His

first sentence reminds us, truly, that by human standards, the world today *is* half slave and half free. Out of four billion persons, something approaching a billion and a half live in totalitarian Marxist states. We have come to think of this opposition in East-West terms.

But of a sudden the President directs our concern to quite a different matter, that of relations between the industrial North and the developing South. Indeed, he calls on the Soviets, as part of the former group, to join in "common aid efforts" to help the latter.

It is as if—with no further consideration—we should divert our attention from the central political struggle of our time—that between liberal democracy and totalitarian Communism—and focus instead on something else.

And, are not consequences of such a transposition already apparent in other places in the President's speech? He says that we are now "free" of our "inordinate fear of Communism," a fear which led us at times to abandon our values for the values of the totalitarians, which in turn led us to the "intellectual and moral poverty" of the war in Vietnam.

Now, it is not that one ought to have an *inordinate* fear of anything that causes me to wonder whether this characterization of our experience in Vietnam is quite so self-evident. Neither the Secretary of State (then Deputy Secretary of Defense) nor the Secretary of Defense (then Secretary of the Air Force) —men who at one time or another directed the Vietnam enterprise—are men one readily associates with "intellectual and moral poverty." That the enterprise was doomed, we need not dispute. Some of us said so at the time. But must we so readily embrace what is so very near to our adversaries' depiction of our purposes?

And, perhaps of greater importance, to whom does the President refer when he says that through the failure of Vietnam, "we have found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence."

Is this really so, or have we merely regained our composure by an addictive and deepening habit of avoiding reality? For if you say that we never should have fought the war in Vietnam, it is possible to avoid having to face the fact that we lost it.

All manner of defeats can be avoided in that way. We tell

ourselves the nation faces an energy crisis. But we do not tell ourselves that this problem has come about through a massive defeat in foreign policy, which is to say the successful quadrupling of oil prices by the OPEC oil cartel at the time of the 1973 Mideast war. A foreign cartel restricts supply: We tell ourselves that a problem of supply is a problem of demand. A foreign cartel raises the price: We tell ourselves that a problem of price is a problem of profligacy.

Again: We tell ourselves—using the words of the President—that our basic optimism in the future of the democratic system is infectious, that "our spirit of confidence is spreading." "We can already see," he puts it, "dramatic worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state."

It is true—and important—that the two remaining fascist states in Europe have come back into the democratic fold. India caught herself just in time. But what else has happened? The history of our time is the history of totalitarian advance.

What is more, the nondemocratic nations of the world—as distinguished from the totalitarian nations—show not the least evidence that they see the balance of forces moving in any other direction. On June 3, 1977, for example, the cause of closer North-South cooperation sustained a severe setback at the International Labor Conference in Geneva. Two years ago the ILO at its annual conference adopted a resolution condemning Israel for "racism." This vicious and heinous charge, this acid thrown in the face of an entire people, first appeared there. Let there be no mistake as to where the charge originated. It originated in the Soviet Union, in the propaganda organs of that totalitarian Communist state. American trade unionists are not without experience in these encounters and, with the support of American business representatives, induced the American government to give notice that the United States would withdraw from the ILO unless such practices stopped. All the United States asked was that the ILO keep extraneous political issues out of its deliberations, so that it might get on with its work, which is now overwhelmingly concerned with the developing nations. And what did the developing nations do? On June 3, by a parliamentary device, they prevented any change in the conference rules that would make this possible. They did this at the very

moment the so-called North-South Conference (Conference on International Economic Cooperation) was meeting in Paris 300 miles away, where they were asking for vastly greater amounts of Western aid, whilst refusing to discuss oil prices and accepting without comment the position of the Soviet Union that any aid they receive must come from the democratic nations and not the totalitarian ones.

Now who spoke against us at the International Labor Conference? Who spoke, in effect, for anti-Semitism? Who spoke, in effect, for the destruction of the Israeli democracy? The Soviet Union, of course, and of course Cuba. Mongolia. Yugoslavia. Poland, East Germany. Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Somalia, and a new entrant, the Philippines. As will be noted, not many of the nonaligned spoke against us. But, in effect, they all *voted* against us. As is usual in these matters, the representatives of these nations are now murmuring explanations and apologies in the corridors. I repeat, as usual. This is standard operating procedure. Publicly side with the Communists; privately express regret to the democracies. (I must exempt the Yugoslavs in this matter. They know that we will allow them to say anything about us, do anything to us, and in consequence show their contempt both publicly *and* privately.) At first I thought this to be frankly cynical behavior. But later I came to think differently, to believe that the new nations, especially in Africa, don't want to be against us always. It is just that they are afraid to be against the Soviets. And on the record one does not blame them.

The President, in my view, is entirely correct in the fresh emphasis he has given to what we call North-South relations. But I wish to suggest that this must not be allowed to divert us from the reality of the military and ideological competition with the Soviet Union which continues and, if anything, escalates. I cite Michael Novak on what he calls the "significantly growing imperial power of the Soviet Union."

> It is difficult for one who is a liberal to try to sound alarms about grave military dangers. Yet there are such dangers. If we do not awaken from our slumber soon, Israel may be lost and much of Europe, too.

And there is a further consideration. If we genuinely care about the developing world, then we must look to the behavior of the Soviet Union, for with respect to the non-Communist

regions of the world, be they developed or underdeveloped, there is one Soviet policy: the worse the better. I speak from what is no longer a brief experience of international affairs. In nation after nation, at conference after conference, what the Soviets seek is failure, breakdown, bitterness, mistrust. They judge that they thrive on this, and history certainly does not disprove them. *Our* task is twofold. First, to see this ourselves. It is not necessarily a confidence-building exercise, but it is indispensable. Second, to bring the developing nations to see it as well. This is never easy. It is at times excruciatingly painful, and it ensures a good deal of near-term obloquy. But it is the true measure of commitment.

The March of Defeat

MICHAEL NOVAK

President Carter's Notre Dame speech does not make me, as he hoped, "proud to be an American." It is a profoundly embarrassing and disturbing speech. Listen again to the concluding lines:

> Let me conclude by summarizing: Our policy is based on an historical vision of America's role. Our policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind.
>
> It is a policy that I hope will make you proud to be Americans.

On each of these summary counts, the President's vision is deficient. It is deficient both in realism and fact. It is deficient in its moral vision. The President uses the word *moral* and its cognates—*values, principles, social justice,* and the like—very heavily indeed. But he does not use them well.

1. The President speaks about "our essential character" as a nation, as though this character were primarily moral, virtuous, and humane. American history is actually far more tragic than he supposes. From the beginning, aggrandizement, greed, power, trickery, and conniving characterized the settlers of this conti-

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nent, as also did liberty, justice, and equality under the law. Even the "historical vision of America's role"—her manifest destiny—was not unmarred by a mixture of righteousness and aggression. (Consider the history of the Panama Canal, for example. Or President McKinley's decision to invade the Philippines.) It is rather characteristic of "our essential character" and our "historical vision of America's role" that we should employ a highly biblical and moralistic language in the service of aggrandizement. America's involvement in the rest of the world brought moral gains and losses for each participant. Innocent, Americans have not been, but they have not been a fully oppressive imperial power, either. One of the best ways to create an immoral foreign policy is to try too hard for a moral one.

Most notable, then, in the President's speech at Notre Dame are the pre-eminence he gives to moral considerations and his comparative neglect of questions of power. "The great democracies," he said, "are not free because we are strong and prosperous. I believe we are strong and influential and prosperous because we are free." But this is too simple. Had the United States and its allies not been strong enough to vanquish the extraordinarily disciplined armies of Hitler, the democracies might well not be free. In 1940, the outlook appeared bleak; Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy in London was predicting the victory of Hitler. Again, if the United States were a free but weak democracy, mere freedom would not suffice to make us "strong and influential and prosperous." Why is the President so loath to commend our might and our economic power? Are these—in his eyes—unworthy? "We want the world to know that our nation stands for more than financial prosperity," he says. Those who carry a big stick may speak softly. But they ought not to appear to be ashamed of having a big stick.

"In the life of the human spirit," the President said, "words are action." But even in the life of the human spirit, actions speak louder than words. The President cites the force of the words of dissidents in totalitarian countries. But if dissidents in totalitarian countries were to take action rather than merely to speak out, their actions would be crushed even more thoroughly than their words have been. Words have power, but they are not the same as deeds. The President speaks as though the American role were to "set an example," and in the few isolated

acts of a tiny number of dissidents in a few places he sees "dramatic worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state." This is self-deluding nonsense. The few acts of resistance are like leaves blowing outside iron gates.

When the President thinks about such things he does so, he confides, not with an eye upon reality but with an eye upon his moral image: "For us to ignore this trend would be to lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to regain the moral stature we once had." As though Sakharov braves prison in order to add lustre to America's moral stature, rather than in order to become liberated from the cruelest and most thorough totalitarian society ever experienced by the human race. Is the President blinded by the gleam of his own moral armor, so as not to see the depressing realities of millions who suffer in the day-after-day silence of the Gulag Archipelago? The world does not wait for our words about human rights, but for a sound diagnosis of the chief systematic source of their abuse.

2. The President announced that he is moving toward "eliminating nuclear weapons completely from our arsenals of death." Here the audience applauded, according to the press secretary's text, for the sole occasion during the speech. The prospect of nuclear incineration makes everyone anxious, and applause must necessarily relieve such anxiety. But is the President prepared to conscript, and to pay for, the standing armies in Europe that will be required to balance the Soviet divisions, whose power is now counterbalanced by the threat of nuclear weapons? In the life of the human body, as distinct perhaps from the life of the human spirit, words are not sufficient against armed divisions. The seriousness of the President's moral language is in question.

"We hope to persuade the Soviet Union," the President added, "that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another." But how will the President so persuade the very Soviet leaders who ordered tanks into Prague? Will he talk with them? Explain the teachings of Jesus? Bargain with them? Make the costs of such imposition unsustainable? What does "persuade" mean? It is not likely that the President believes that the leaders of the Soviet Union act by inadvertence, or even by personal preference. Certainly he knows that the Soviet Union has na-

tional interests and needs which demand that it exert control over various parts of the planet, for the safety, security, and long-range prosperity of the Soviet system. These are independent of the personality or character of Soviet leaders. What role has "persuasion" in altering such matters? In reforming totalitarianism regimes?

3. The speach at Notre Dame was given on May 22, 1977, and the President said: "This may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement [in the Middle East] since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost thirty years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean disaster." But the realities of the Middle East, though they shift from day to day like the sands of the desert, do not radically change from year to year. Patience may be more successful than meddling. The President speaks of "a Palestinian homeland." But Jordan, although under Bedouin rule, is three quarters Palestinian. Space prevents a full discussion of this issue. But the President appeared at Notre Dame to be moralizing at Israel's expense.

4. "More than a hundred years ago Abraham Lincoln said our nation could not exist half slave and half free," said the President, immediately, then, changing the subject: "We know a peaceful world cannot exist one third rich and two thirds hungry." Many in the world are indeed hungry. But there is a prior issue. Less than half the world—barely a third—is free. More than two thirds is slave. What will President Carter do about that?

In 1977, the population of this planet is considerably richer than it was in 1945, to say nothing of in 1900. Nearly a third of the planet's people has moved into the middle class, from having been barely at subsistence levels at the beginning of this century. Hunger, or at least poverty, is the long-trend line of the human race. Such poverty did not begin with the present generation or with present-day economic systems. Such poverty is not a matter that President Carter can alter. The only intent of bringing up "hunger," one gathers, is to induce a feeling of guilt. Why? For what purpose? If states were free, would their peoples not be less hungry? The President himself said: "The great democracies . . . are strong and influential and prosperous because they are free." Why then, does he not commit the resources of this nation to liberating the unfree? If he

wishes to end hunger and poverty, let him first break the shackles of whole empires of the unfree.

5. To challenge the unfree nations on this planet is the only path toward realism. Such a challenge need not be by way of war. But it most certainly must include considerations of superior power. In the real world, power need not be boasted about, flaunted, or even called into direct play; it may rest discreetly out of sight. The crucial point is that such power be both unchallengeable and well known. The role of a world power may, indeed, involve mistakes—mistakes not only of strategy or tactics, but also of moral judgment or intellect—for no human enterprise is infallible or always correct. But what one ought to learn from mistakes is, not to quit, but to carry on with renewed dedication. President Carter, it appears, has fallen under the spell of defeatists who, in the name of a higher morality in words, have designed a retreat from reality, from responsibility, and from truth. And of this they ask us to be proud.

A Lack of Ideological Roots

JOHN P. ROCHE

President Carter's Notre Dame commencement address on the moral foundations of American foreign policy under normal circumstances would be an acceptable example of that art form. As a thirty-year veteran who long since reached the conviction that commencement addresses were drafted by computers, I am certain I have heard this one four times. Indeed, had I absorbed it without advance information on the source, I might have attributed it to Eleanor Roosevelt, Arthur Goldberg, Harold Stassen, or George McGovern. (At half an hour it was a bit brief for Hubert Humphrey, God bless him.) In short, it was standard commencement pap by an American "statesman": "Speech 5c—American Policy, Morality, and the World (for use at a liberal religious school)."

Instead of treating it as a standard May or June by-blow, the President and his busy backgrounders announced to the world that the Notre Dame speech would formalize and systemize Mr. Carter's conception of a moral foreign policy, that it would be a

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beacon penetrating the murky night of pragmatism and illuminating for all the world the lineaments of grace. Thus it is not unfair to give it some careful textual analysis of the sort which, in the normal course of events, is rarely accorded banal farewells to college seniors. Since Mr. Carter chose to unveil his Rock of Ages in this form, he can hardly object to some chipping.

There was an interesting symmetry about the Notre Dame ceremony. First, honorary degrees were conferred on three distinguished Catholic prelates for their defense of human freedom against the oppressive regimes in Rhodesia, Brazil, and South Korea. These awards were richly merited, but it might be noted that Cardinals Arns and Kim and Bishop Lamont were present for the event.

Nothing in academic protocol forbids the award of honorary degrees in absentia, but somehow no fighters for religious freedom—Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or Buddhist—were selected from, say, the Soviet Union, China, or Vietnam. The Cardinals have rejected government repression—a Christian witness I share completely—but the leaders of the Lithuanian Catholics, or Ukrainian Uniates, are dead, imprisoned, or perhaps worse, confined to KGB psychiatric wards. Who honors them?

Perhaps this is nit-picking, but to me it suggests the lack of precision and calibration that characterized Mr. Carter's speech and his whole human rights policy. To put it succinctly, one can reject racism as a principle but still differentiate between Adolf Hitler and Ian Smith or between Idi Amin and Jomo Kenyatta. As a Social Democrat, I would have been dead twenty years ago if I had been a mainland Chinese or a North Korean. In Taiwan or South Korea, life would have had plenty of lumps, but sooner or later my American friends would have bailed me out and I could come to the United States, write ferocious letters about "corrupt, repressive regimes" to the newspapers, and maybe collect some honorary degrees. As the Tudors and Joseph Stalin knew, "dead men have no fellows."

Part of Mr. Carter's problem in world politics is the lack of any ideological roots, a weakness which has been buttressed by a McGovernite "issues staff" which sincerely believes that the world began in January 1977, when they took office. In this state of historical amnesia it is hard to deal with the degrees on the scale between "good" and "bad." What would they say, for example, to the Greek Jew who stated "Francisco Franco saved us from

Hitler's deathcamps"? Probably nothing, because to them morality and human rights are grand abstractions, not case studies in the human condition.

Indeed, there are ghosts I wish they could meet. One was a Yugoslav Communist, now dead, who was captured in 1932 and tossed into one of King Alexander's prisons. Conditions were hardly ideal, the guards genially brutal, and he envied his comrades who escaped to the Soviet Union—until one day his guard entered the cell laughing and, instead of giving him the ritual clout, handed him a newspaper. It informed him that shortly before they were executed his comrades in Moscow had confessed, told all. They had been British agents, tools of King Alexander, Trotskyite-Bukharinite wreckers, and enemies of the working class. "Come now," said his guard, "aren't you lucky we are protecting you?"

To Manichaeans such ambiguities are intolerable, so they ignore them or define them out of existence. But not only were President Carter's draftsmen Manichaean, they were specialists in bizarre logic. Try the following for size:

1. "We are confident that democratic methods are the most effective, and *so* we are not tempted to employ improper tactics here at home or abroad."

2. "We have fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, *with Vietnam the best example* of its intellectual and moral poverty." (Italics added.)

Item one is a classic non sequitur, or meaningless, or both. Does Mr. Carter really believe we could have defeated Nazism by landing in Normandy with sound trucks and precinct workers instead of tanks and infantry? If not, what in Heaven's name are "democratic methods"? If John Quincy Adams had made this statement, it would parse: Adams believed we should let the democratic light shine before mankind and otherwise mind our own hemispheric business. This was classic moralism, American style, based on both self-interest and democratic hubris. In contemporary terms it is isolationist unless we believe that "destabilizing" an undemocratic regime in Africa or Latin America is a proper democratic tactic.

If the President accepts this definition, fine. But he can't have any favorite undemocratic governments: Ambassador Andrew Young must take on a country a day in the battle for human

rights and majority rule, ideally beginning with the big sinners—the Soviet Union and China—and working down the list to Equatorial Guinea and the Seychelles. He might solve a lot of problems: majority rule in Jordan, for example, could create an instant Palestinian Arab homeland and defuse the Palestine Liberation Organization. Young might find the task a bit boring, but then it could occupy him throughout his lifetime at steady wages.

Item two is in the same category. Whether one accepts or condemns our intervention in Vietnam, one must admit that we lost because we refused to take General LeMay's advice and return North Vietnam to the Stone Age. As a supporter of limited war, I opposed LeMay's prescription, but I will still argue (to use Carter's clumsy metaphor) that our "fire" (overall response) was poorly planned and executed. When we took to "water," we sailed off, abandoned the Vietnamese to totalitarianism, and demonstrated shameful "moral poverty."

Enough of this taxonomic exercise. The point is that under close scrutiny Mr. Carter's great design for a democratic, moral foreign policy comes down to rhetorical fluff. Even to analyze it precisely is like nailing jelly to a wall. Perhaps the central and concluding criticism I would make is his assumption that "in the life of the human spirit, words are action." I agree with St. John that "in the beginning was the Word," but I submit that words are only threshold actions. That is, they are stimuli which, if anything is to be accomplished, must trigger concrete policies. In short, the right words are necessary, but they are not sufficient to the implementation of foreign policy.

To put it differently, after putting down this sermon I asked myself Lyndon Johnson's favorite question: "Therefore, what?" This cold recall to reality infuriated a number of intellectuals who had explained to him the complexities of the world, but at base government is the quest for decisions, not conclusions. In Carter's case, I haven't the foggiest idea "what" these abstractions amount to, how they guide our handling of the Middle East, détente, Eurocommunism, and other major current problems. I think it was Georges Clemenceau who, in carefully nuanced French, referred to Woodrow Wilson as a man of "grandeur simple." Carter's manifesto would surely have invoked the same sardonic description.

Ignoring Soviet Realities

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

President Carter's Notre Dame speech is his most ambitious attempt thus far to explain his perception of world politics and to define the American national interest in its course. The speech is deeply flawed: inconsistent; incomplete; and excessive in its claims of novelty. Two of its flaws are fatal. The speech lacks any conception of the relationship between power and morality in international affairs. And it violates the most fundamental norm of democratic political life, because it does not report the realities of Soviet behavior as the government experiences them. In lulling and reassuring public opinion about what the Soviet Union is up to, President Carter is following the example of Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger, not that of Truman and Acheson.

President Carter begins by proclaiming that we are living in a new world, different from the world between 1945 and the end of the Vietnam War. The earlier period was dominated by two principles, he suggests: a belief that Soviet expansion was inevitable and had to be contained and a corresponding belief

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in an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic—hardly a fair comment on a system of security relations which includes Japan, Yugoslavia, Australia and New Zealand, Communist China, and Iran, among others, as well as the nations of Western Europe.

Vietnam produced a worldwide moral crisis, the President goes on, and a crisis of confidence from which he believes that the United States has fully recovered. Now, he urges, we must bring forward a new foreign policy, addressed to the new world after Vietnam and responsive to the awakening political consciousness of the developing nations. Our concern should be to help shape an international system governed by a concern, not only for stability and peace, but for justice, equity, and human rights as well. Curiously, the President's speech does not mention the United Nations Charter, which purports to organize the international quest for these goals.

"We are now free," the President declared, "of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear." That outlook, he announced, is being changed, although he also pointed out that we cannot "conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims." The world is too imperfect, complex, and confused for so simple a rule.

But, the President said, "the unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive even though the competition has become more extensive."

To replace the policy he assumes was swept away in the Vietnam disaster, the President proposes a foreign policy of "global involvement,"—"an open and candid" foreign policy, and one which "the American people both support and for a change know about and understand."

President Carter derives his new policy from five premises which turn out to be among the classic themes of American foreign policy since 1947: (1) America's commitment to human liberty, the essence of our being and the heart of our cause; (2) reinforced ties of alliance and collaboration with the industrialized democracies of Western Europe (and, presumably, of the Pacific area as well); (3) continued efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to negotiate fair agreements to end the threat of nuclear weapons, prohibit chemical warfare, and establish arms limitations in the Indian Ocean, and to collaborate with us in

providing aid to developing nations; (4) continued efforts as well to help the parties negotiate peace for the Middle East; and (5) an intensification of the campaign to end or reduce proliferation of nuclear weapons and arms transfers, unilaterally if necessary, even at the cost of friction with our allies and friends.

These five lines of policy, the President adds, are only "a beginning aimed toward a clear goal, to create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new and rapidly changing historical circumstances."

I shall confine this note to the two flaws in the Notre Dame speech I noted earlier as fundamental: its bland and optimistic portrayal of Soviet behavior and the absence of any theory linking power and morality in international affairs.

In a breathtaking passage, President Carter remarks, "We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state's military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola."

Does this extraordinary statement of purpose suggest that the President intends to roll back the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe, or the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam? Does he suppose that he can persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its program of imperial expansion in Africa and the Middle East through reason alone? When he speaks of Cuban intervention in Angola in the past tense, is he suggesting that the Cubans have withdrawn their forces from Angola and other countries of Africa?

There is no need at this point to examine the doctrinal arguments about Soviet "intentions." American policy must rest on the record of what the Soviet Union has done and is doing and on the astronomic increase of its military capabilities—an increase which continues at an undiminished rate in every sphere, strategic and conventional. The only prudent assumption for American policy today is that the Soviet Union will take advantage of every opportunity for expansion unless confronted by unacceptable risk.

American foreign policy during the years between the Second World War and the end of the Vietnam War was not dominated by an "inordinate fear of Communism," but by a legitimate concern for policies of Soviet expansion and aggression. We

have had excellent relations with Communist Yugoslavia for more than twenty-five years, as we have promising security relations with Communist China today. The basis of that policy is not ideological, but strategic. The United States can be safe, and free, only in a world of wide horizons, which no hostile power can dominate through the use or the credible threat to use overwhelming military force. Our first national interest in world politics has been and must remain to achieve and maintain a stable balance of power. President Carter recognized this inescapable fact about national security in his Inaugural Address, where he said "it is clear that a world which others can dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and a threat to the well-being of all people."

The pressures of Soviet imperialism have not become "less intensive" in recent years. On the contrary, they have become bolder, more acute, and more pervasive than ever before, as Soviet conventional power has increased, and the American commitment to the defense of its own national interests has flagged, in the shadow of Korea and Vietnam. None of the desirable ongoing political, economic, and social goals of our foreign policy will be within our reach until we recover our sense of reality about the fundamental problem of the balance of power—the problem we used to call that of containment. There is debate in the United States about what constitutes an appropriate balance of power, from the point of view of American national security. Nearly everyone agrees that we cannot afford to allow the Soviet Union to control Western Europe and Japan. As President Carter remarked in his speech to the North Atlantic Council, the Soviet military posture in Europe is offensive and cannot be justified by reason of defense. As we have realized in recent years, centers of power can be outflanked and enveloped. The independence of South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines is vital to the security of Japan and Communist China, and the independence of the Middle East is vital to the security of Western Europe. Soviet hegemony in Africa and the Red Sea could threaten the sea lanes on which the United States, Europe, and Japan depend for raw materials and military supply. A Maginot Line strategy for the defense of our vital national interests would be as foolish today as it proved to be for France in 1940.

The only possible predicate for President Carter's conception

of world order is the Charter of the United Nations. The effort to impose generally accepted rules of restraint with regard to the international use of force goes back to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the volcanic experience of war which preceded it. The Vienna system worked reasonably well for a century. It suffered a setback in 1914 and was resumed after the First World War through the agency of the League of Nations. After the collapse of the League during the thirties, the quest for general international peace was taken up once more, with greater conviction than ever, through the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the conviction that "peace is indivisible."

The Charter is not self-enforcing. Since the Soviet Union has refused to cooperate in developing the Security Council as the central organ for keeping the peace, the enforcement of the Charter depends primarily on the exercise by states of what the Charter calls their inherent right of individual and collective self-defense: on policies such as those of NATO, the Korean and Vietnamese campaigns, and other arrangements for collective defense which have been established over the years in many parts of the world.

The willingness to use force in defense of the Charter is the necessary condition for success in the quest for world order.

Even in the heyday of the Truman Doctrine, exceptions to the apparent universality of the Charter were tacitly recognized. In Eastern Europe, for example, which has been treated as a Soviet sphere of influence, the principle of self-determination was not applied.

Since the beginning of the end in Vietnam, however, the tacit exceptions to the rules of the Charter have begun to loom larger than the rules themselves. The number, scale, and importance of international aggressions have increased dramatically—aggressions supported in each case by the Soviet Union. To confirm this statement, one need only recall the conflict in Lebanon, the successive attacks on Sudan, the war in Bangladesh, and the conflict now raging in both Southern and Northern Africa, to say nothing of the open breach of the 1973 agreements for peace in Indochina and the Arab attack on Israel in 1973—all acts of aggression supported and upheld by the Soviet Union.

That fact challenges the possibility of the political system posited by the United Nations Charter—a system of world

politics ordered by law: a system more just than the imperial system of the past, and more progressive; a system which aspires to develop peaceful procedures for vindicating human rights and the self-determination of peoples; but above all, a system of international peace.

The process of aggression is cumulative and self-reinforcing. Its momentum is increasing, and it is becoming more and more difficult to contain. The rules are being swallowed by the exceptions.

In short, the Charter of the United Nations is going the way of the Covenant of the League. Large parts of the world are sinking into anarchy, and many others live in increasing fear of anarchy. The West cannot afford to go on accepting a situation in which we live by the rules of the Charter governing the international use of force, while the Soviet Union and its proxies, satellites, and allies violate those rules on a scale which becomes larger and more dangerous with every passing year. Unless we and our allies, backed by Communist China, insist on mutual and reciprocal respect for the rules of the Charter, they will disappear as an influence on the behavior of states, and the slide toward general war will become overwhelming.

This is the most important problem President Carter failed to address in his Notre Dame speech, or in his United Nations speech—a problem absolutely central to the concept of world order that he professes to support.

Ideals, Maxims, and Deeds

ROGER L. SHINN

President Carter is shrewd enough to beat me to the most obvious complaint I might make about his Notre Dame speech. We cannot, he says, "conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect and will always be imperfect—a world that is complex and confused, and which will always be complex and confused."

Since he recognizes the difficulty, I must wonder why he uses so extensively the language of moral idealism, frequently without showing its relation to the hard and complicated decisions he regularly makes. There must be a reason. My opinion is that the reason is an authentic moral yearning in President Carter's personality, a yearning that he believes (and I believe) is deeply part of the American character, even though we verbalize it vaguely and sometimes hypocritically.

Mr. Carter says that we live in "a new world." I think there is much truth in that statement, and I think the President really sees that truth. But when he describes "a new American foreign policy" and contrasts it with the "failure" of foreign policy in the recent past, he is slipping into the sort of moralism that new

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presidents usually exhibit. President Kennedy did the same thing in the bravura of his inaugural address, before he presided over the Bay of Pigs disaster. I think that, in fact, there are failures of the past that President Carter really wants to reverse in his foreign policy. I want him to succeed. But when he comes to concrete decisions, he faces the difficulties of relating his ideals to his deeds. Two examples leap out of his speech.

1. Mr. Carter reaffirms the concern for human rights that he has made a symbol of his administration. His affirmations have been heard around the world. I have had some small chance to question a few Asians, Africans, Latin Americans, and Europeans about their estimate of his stance. The cynics, of course, thought he was using human rights as a club to belabor his opponents and to lay aside when dealing with his allies. More people than I expected, however, responded with approval and hope. More often than not those living in countries whose governments trample on human rights applauded the President's position; some thought it was doing some small good in their homelands.

But the relevance of the human rights policy varies. There are governments such as those in the Soviet Union and Brazil where Mr. Carter's position arouses irritation and angry retorts. There are countries such as Uganda where it makes not the slightest impact, and there are other countries such as Rhodesia and South Africa where it may, after many complicated maneuvers, help to shape history. And there are countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, and Iran where the United States soft-pedals the policy because they are our allies.

All in all, I agree with the human rights stand of the President. I hope he can move the world a little. Even the idealistic language has some symbolic value in a world that too often associates the United States with oppressive tyrants. But the payoff is in actions, and these at best are complex efforts springing from many motives. Since that is the case, I wish that the President's rhetoric were not quite so simple and self-righteous.

2. The second example is the armaments race. Mr. Carter wants to "halt the strategic arms race" and take steps "toward eliminating nuclear weapons completely." But he has already found that progress in the SALT talks is harder than it seemed in campaign speeches.

I assume that both the United States and the Soviet Union would prefer to avoid a nuclear conflagration, which would be disastrous to both. I assume also that the two governments distrust each other, that neither wants its military weakness to tempt the other, and that both are constantly maneuvering for whatever advantages they can gain, short of war, in relation to the other. (This is not to say that I equate their values or their strategies; I have my clear preferences and commitments. But I see similarities in the two assumptions I have mentioned.) The tough issues of foreign policy come not in announcing goals of peace—the Russians and we can talk alike that way—but in relating the first assumption to the second.

The same issue arises in Mr. Carter's emphasis on a national policy that will seek to reduce U.S. sales of arms to other countries. I believe that he is serious in his hopes: He talked about them in his campaign, reiterated them in his first press interview after his inauguration (January 23), and has emphasized them again at Notre Dame and on several other occasions. He has said that the dollar volume of our sales of arms will decrease annually. But his decisions relate curiously to his goals. He has endorsed new large sales to Iran, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan. In some cases he has urged a reluctant Congress to sell the most sophisticated military equipment. And the sales for the current fiscal year may set an all-time record.

Does this mean that the President's words are insincere? I think not. There is evidence that Mr. Carter has actually held back on some arms sales recommended by his advisers. The problem is that the world is more complicated than the presidential speeches.

President Carter is known to have an interest in the theological ethic of the late Reinhold Niebuhr. June Bingham, author of *Courage to Change: An Introduction to the Life and Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr*, happily he had the nerve to ask to borrow Mr. Carter's gift copy of that book. She wanted to see what passages he might have marked—there were fifty-seven.

One such passage was a direct quotation from Niebuhr: "Love must be aggressively transplanted into simple justice." Mr. Carter paraphrased that sentence in his acceptance speech at the Democratic convention, then talked about it while teaching his Sunday School class in Plains, Georgia, soon thereafter. Another

marked passage was Mrs. Bingham's own sentence: "Niebuhr is forever at war with oversimplification."

I am glad that the President is not ashamed to speak openly about ethics in government policy. Ethical references by politicians can be simply the hypocrisy that covers up personal and national self-interest. So often is this the case that a cynical world has come to distrust all moral claims in political discourse. But national morality is not all hypocrisy. After all, there can be no national interest that does not include the dominant values of a nation, and those values deserve to be enunciated.

The problem lies in the translation of values into policy and in the oversimplification that bedevils most political speeches. I do not mean that Mr. Carter should learn to talk with the pedantic jargon of academic specialists in ethics. Political speeches are a different—and equally legitimate—genre. But as one who endorses the spirit and intention of Mr. Carter's speech at Notre Dame, I hope he learns to communicate more clearly on the relation of moral maxims to "a world that is complex and confused."

PART THREE

Other Comment

Morality and Power

HENRY A. KISSINGER

From the time of the Declaration of our Independence, Americans have believed that this country has a moral significance for the world. The United States was created as a conscious act by men and women dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles they held to be of universal meaning. Small wonder, then, that Santayana declared that "being an American is, of itself, almost a moral condition."

At the same time, since Tocqueville, it has been observed that we are a pragmatic people, commonsensical, undogmatic, undoctrinaire—a nation with a permanent bent to the practical and an instinct for what works. We have defined our basic goals—justice, freedom, equality, and progress—in open and libertarian terms, seeking to enlarge opportunity and the human spirit rather than to coerce a uniform standard of behavior or a common code of doctrine and belief.

This duality of our nature is *not* at war with reality. For in international politics, our morality and power should not be

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antithetical. Any serious foreign policy must begin with the need for survival. And survival has its practical necessities. A nation does not willingly delegate control over its future. For a great power to remit its security to the mercy of others is an abdication of foreign policy. All serious foreign policy therefore begins with maintaining a balance of power—a scope for action, a capacity to affect events and conditions. Without that capacity a nation is reduced to striking empty poses.

But equally, our nation cannot rest its policy on power alone. Our tradition and the values of our people ensure that a policy that seeks only to manipulate force would lack all conviction, consistency, and public support.

This is why America has been most successful in our relations with the world when we combined our idealism and our pragmatism—from the days when our Founding Fathers manipulated the monarchical rivalries of Europe to secure our independence and launch the great democratic experiment to the creative American initiatives after the Second World War such as the Marshall Plan. Our modern efforts to achieve strategic arms limitation, peace in the Middle East and Southern Africa, the opening to China, recasting international economic relations on the basis of the principle of interdependence—have also served both moral and practical ends and can be sustained only by a combination of moral conviction and practical wisdom.

These considerations come to bear powerfully on the question of the relationship between human rights and foreign policy. The world needs to know what this country stands for. But we cannot rest on this; we must know how to implement our convictions and achieve an enhancement of human rights together with other national objectives.

The accomplishment of the new administration is not that it originated the concern with human rights but that, free of the legacy of Vietnam and Watergate, it has seized the opportunity to endow the policy with a more explicit formulation. The aim of the Carter administration has been to give the American people, after the traumas of Vietnam and Watergate, a renewed sense of the basic decency of this country, so that they may continue to have the pride and self-confidence to remain actively involved in the world.

Having had to conduct American foreign policy in a period of national division and self-flagellation, I applaud and support this objective. The President has tapped a wellspring of American patriotism, idealism, unity, and commitment which are vital to our country and to the world. He has focused public concern on one of the greatest blights of our time.

The modern age has brought undreamt-of benefits to mankind—in medicine, in scientific and technological advance, and in communication. But the modern age has also spawned new tools of oppression and of civil strife. Terrorism and bitter ideological contention have weakened bonds of social cohesion; the yearning for order even at the expense of liberty has resulted all too often in the violation of fundamental standards of human decency.

The central moral problem of government has always been to strike a just and effective balance between freedom and authority. When freedom degenerates into anarchy, the human personality becomes subject to arbitrary, brutal, and capricious forces—witness aberrations of terrorism in even the most humane societies. Yet when the demand for order overrides all other considerations, man becomes a means and not an end, a tool of impersonal machinery.

Human rights are the very essence of a meaningful life, and human dignity is the ultimate purpose of civil government. Respect for the rights of man is written into the founding documents of almost every nation of the world. It has long been part of the common speech and daily lives of our citizens.

The obscene and atrocious acts systematically employed to devalue, debase, and destroy man during the Second World War vividly and ineradicably impressed on the world the enormity of the challenge to human rights. It was to end such abuses and to provide moral authority in international affairs that new institutions and legal standards were forged after that war—globally in the United Nations and in this hemisphere in a strengthened inter-American system.

The fact remains that continuing practices of intimidation, terror, and brutality, fostered sometimes from outside national territories and sometimes from inside, mark the distance yet to be traveled before the community of nations can claim that it is truly civilized. This is why the distinguished junior senator

from New York, Senator Moynihan, is surely right in stressing that human rights should be not simply a humanitarian program but a political component of American foreign policy.

For the difference between freedom and totalitarianism is not transient or incidental; it is a moral conflict, of fundamental historical proportions, which gives the modern age its special meaning and peril. Our defense of human rights reminds us of the fundamental reason that our competition with totalitarian systems is vital to the cause of mankind.

There is no reason for us to accept the hypocritical double standard increasingly prevalent in the United Nations, where petty tyrannies berate us for our alleged moral shortcomings. On this issue we are not—and have no reason to be—on the defensive. "The cause of human liberty," the poet Archibald MacLeish has written, "is now the one great revolutionary cause."

And yet, while human rights must be an essential component of our foreign policy, to pursue it effectively over the long term we must take the measure of the dangers and dilemmas along the way.

First, any foreign policy must ultimately be judged by its operational results. "In foreign relations," Walter Lippmann once wrote, "as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance."

To be sure, the advocacy of human rights has in itself a political and even strategic significance. But in the final reckoning more than advocacy will be counted. If we universalize our human rights policy, applying it undiscriminatingly and literally to all countries, we run the risk of becoming the world's policeman—an objective the American people may not support.

At a minimum we will have to answer what may be the question for several friendly governments: How and to what extent we will support them if they get into difficulties by following our maxims. And we will have to indicate what sanctions we will apply to less well disposed governments which challenge the very precepts of our policy.

If, on the other hand, we confine ourselves to proclaiming objectives that are not translated into concrete actions and specific results, we run the risk of demonstrating that we are impotent and of evoking a sense of betrayal among those our human rights

policy seeks to help. Such a course could tempt unfriendly governments to crack down all the harder on their dissidents, in order to demonstrate the futility of our proclamations—this indeed has already happened to some extent in the Soviet Union.

Nor can we escape from the dilemma by asserting that there is no connection between human rights behavior and our attitude on other foreign policy problems—by "unlinking," as the technical phrase goes, human rights from other issues. For this implies that there is no cost or consequence to the violation of human rights, turning our proclamation of human rights into a liturgical theme—decoupled, unenforced, and compromised.

Or else we will insist on our values only against weaker countries, in Latin America or Asia, many of which may even be conducting foreign policies supportive of our own. This would lead to the paradox that the weaker the nation and the less its importance on the international scene, the firmer and more uncompromising would be our human rights posture.

Second, precisely because human rights advocacy is a powerful political weapon, we must be careful that in its application we do not erode all moral dividing lines. We must understand the difference between governments making universal ideological claims and countries which do not observe all democratic practices—either because of domestic turmoil, foreign danger, or national traditions—but which make no claim to historical permanence or universal relevance.

In the contemporary world it is the totalitarian systems which have managed the most systematic and massive repression of the rights of men.

In recent decades, no totalitarian regime has ever evolved into a democracy. Several authoritarian regimes—such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal—have done so. We must therefore maintain the moral distinction between aggressive totalitarianism and other governments which, with all their imperfections, are trying to resist foreign pressures or subversion and which thereby help preserve the balance of power in behalf of all free peoples.

Our human rights policy owes special consideration to the particular international and domestic setting of governments important to our security and supportive of free world security interests. There are, of course, some transgressions of human rights which no necessity—real or imagined—can justify. But

there are also realities in the threats nations face, either from terrorism at home such as in Argentina or aggression across borders such as Iran or Korea.

And we must keep in mind that the alternative to some governments that resist totalitarianism with authoritarian methods may not be greater democracy and an enhancement of human rights but the advent of even more repression, more brutality, more suffering. The ultimate irony would be a posture of resignation toward totalitarian states and harassment of those who would be our friends and who have every prospect of evolving in a more humane direction.

We must take care, finally, that our affirmation of human rights is not manipulated by our political adversaries to isolate countries whose security is important for the future of freedom, even if their domestic practices fall short of our maxims.

The membership of the UN Human Rights Commission, composed as it is of a number of nations with extremely dubious human rights practices, does not augur well for an objective approach to this issue in the United Nations. Cuba and other Communists governments, as well as the more repressive regimes of the less developed world, have no moral standing to bring other nations to international account. We should not hesitate to say so.

Third, there is the ominous prospect that the issue of human rights, if not handled with great wisdom, could unleash new forces of American isolationism. This could defeat the administration's goal of using it to mobilize support for continued American involvement in world affairs. That the human rights issue could develop a life of its own, regardless of the administration's prudent sense of its aims and limits, is already evident from some developments in the Congress.

A distorted or misunderstood human rights policy can become the basis and justification of a modern isolationism. What appeals to many as a useful impetus to resistance to the Communist challenge can be used by others to erase all the distinctions between totalitarians and those that resist them, to induce indifference to European Comunist parties' accession to power, or to disrupt security relationships which are essential to maintaining the geopolitical balance. Excuses can be found to deny help to

almost any friendly country at the precise moment when it faces its most serious external challenge.

If conservatives succeeded in unraveling ties with nations on the left and liberals blocked relations with nations on the right, we could find ourselves with no constructive foreign relations at all, except with a handful of industrial democracies. The end result ironically could be the irrelevance of the United States to other nations of the world. A policy of moral advocacy that led to American abdication would surely condemn countless millions to greater suffering, danger, or despair.

Fourth and most fundamental, we should never forget that the key to successful foreign policy is a sense of proportion. Some of the most serious errors of our foreign policy, both of overcommitment and withdrawal, have occurred when we lost the sense of balance between our interests and our ideals. It was under the banners of moralistic slogans a decade and a half ago that we launched adventures that divided our country and undermined our international position.

A few years later, young people were parading in front of the White House carrying coffins and candles and accusing their government of loving war; the national leadership was denounced as excessively, indeed imperialistically, involved in the internal affairs of other nations.

A few years later still, the government was attacked for sacrificing our ethical values on the altar of détente and being *insufficiently* concerned with the domestic behavior of other nations. Neither we nor the rest of the world can any longer afford such extreme fluctuations.

Human rights policy in this period of American responsibility must strengthen the steady purpose and responsible involvement of the American people. It can do so only if it is presented in the context of a realistic assessment of world affairs and not as the magic cure for the difficulties and shortcomings of mankind's contemporary experience.

The administration is surely right in insisting that human rights is a legitimate and recognized subject of international discourse; it is an object of international legal standards—importantly as a result of American initiatives by administrations of both parties.

At the same time, we must recognize that we serve the cause of freedom also by strengthening international security and maintaining ties with other countries defending their independence against external aggression and struggling to overcome poverty, even if their internal structures differ from ours.

We cannot afford to subordinate either concern to the other. Morality without security is ineffectual; security without morality is empty. To establish the relationship and proportion between these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and our nation.

Morality, Liberalism, and Foreign Policy

IRVING KRISTOL

American foreign policy, these days, is under steady criticism for being deficient in "idealism," for lacking moral substance, for betraying our liberal and democratic traditions, and so on and so forth—anyone who reads as he runs can complete the indictment with ease. Governor Carter, during the recent campaign, offered such accusations. President Carter, in the months to come, will be on the receiving end of such accusations. They constitute a permanent theme in public discussion of our foreign policies.

It is all very perplexing. Why is it that we seem unable to construct a foreign policy that is visibly congruent with our moral-political beliefs? Some left-wing critics are at no loss for an answer: our foreign policy is necessarily immoral since we are an immoral nation governed by immoral institutions and exemplifying an immoral way of life. Such simple anti-Americanism does have the virtue of logical coherence, even if most of us, rejecting the premises as absurd, would regard the logic as an exercise in ideological frivolity.

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But most critics of American foreign policy are not of this peculiar left-wing persuasion. They feel that their moralistic judgments flow properly from their loyalty to American values and the American political tradition. They are certainly right, in part. But they are also certainly wrong, in larger part. And I would suggest that the source of their error is twofold:

(1) They lack a mature understanding of the relation between ideals and reality in general; and

(2) they are involved in a crucial (and often willful) misunderstanding of what American political values are, and what the American political tradition means.

During the century-and-a-half of America's relative isolation from international politics, moralistic rhetoric on foreign affairs was cheap, because it was largely divorced from action. Self-righteousness flourishes where personal involvement and personal responsibility are minimal. But ever since the First World War and our emergence as a great power, we have discovered that "moral idealism" has to make its own way in a world that is not particularly hospitable to it.

This is, of course, something we have long since recognized in our domestic affairs. No one who wishes to be taken seriously will assert that the answer to our domestic difficulties simply lies in being true to our democratic and liberal traditions. We understand—the Constitution itself incarnates such an understanding—that there is no unequivocal "moral" answer to our social and economic problems. These problems are complex, and so the relation between reality and morality will also be complex. Doing the "right" thing cannot be divorced from doing the effective thing. And, to complicate matters even further, doing the "right" thing in one respect always means doing the "wrong" thing in other respects.

Take the issue of "self-determination." The United States stands, and has stood from the beginning, for the rights of peoples to govern themselves as independent political entities. But that affirmation does not begin to answer all the questions the real world poses to us under the rubric of "self-determination."

When do "a people" constitute "a nation"? Should American policy favor the national aspirations of the Scots, the Welsh, and the Corsicans? How do we apply the principle of "self-determination" to Northern Ireland? Or to the Palestinians in

the Middle East? Or to the various non-Russian minorities of the the Soviet Union? Or to the Croatian minority in Yugoslavia?

Once one addresses oneself to issues such as these, it is clear that the principle of self-determination doesn't take us very far. Not that the principle is 'wrong'." What *is* wrong is the notion that *any* single principle in politics can take you very far. The reason the human race is a political species is because it generates moral principles which, when coping with reality, turn out to be inconsistent with one another. These principles then have to be adapted to one another and to the concrete circumstances that provoked the inconsistency. This, in turn, involves the compromising—the "betrayal," if you wish—of every single principle regarded in isolation. And that is what politics is all about.

Self-determination is a good thing. And so is majority rule. And so are minority rights. And so is domestic and international tranquility. The trouble is that, most of the time, we can only have some of these good things at the expense of the others. Refusing to accept this fact of life is like refusing to grow up because adults lead such sordid lives.

There are no unmixed goods in this world, just as there are no free lunches. There are many nations where the American ideal of self-government in liberty is simply irrelevant. In those cases, we have to accept that fact—while using our influence to encourage a little movement in the direction of political decency, as we understand it (the abolition of torture, recognition of the right to emigrate, and respect for international law, for example).

Most of the time, since the Second World War, we have been doing just that. Our problem has been that we have been so reluctant to explain to ourselves, much less to the world, what we have been doing and why. When it comes to foreign affairs, our inherited habits of mind, and the rhetoric associated with them, make this kind of candor painful to us. So we actually feel and seem hypocritical when we are merely being sensible. The rest of the world, of course, assumes that behind this superficial hypocrisy lies much realistic cunning. One almost hesitates to disabuse it of this belief.

But there is another, and more dangerous, element in the prevailing moralistic critique of our foreign policy. For this critique makes certain assumptions as to what our fundamental political

values are—and these assumptions are controversial, to put it mildly.

Essentially, and most commonly, they are the current "liberal" assumptions: that equality is far more important than liberty, that powerful government aiming to promote the "common good" is to be preferred to limited government which encourages "the pursuit of happiness." And it is the authority of these assumptions that sanctions the famous "double standard" which our "liberal" moralistic critics apply to foreign affairs.

It has been widely noted, with some exasperation, that those same critics who wax indignant over political prisoners in Chile are not at all concerned about political prisoners in Cuba (which has many more of them) and are positively mute about political prisoners in China or Algeria. They denounce the restrictions on political and civil liberties in South Africa, but are utterly uninterested in the total absence of such liberties in much of black Africa. They think it wrong for West Germany to bar Communists from the civil service, but are profoundly indifferent to the fact that the Soviet Union bars Baptists from holding religious services. One could multiply these instances ad infinitum and ad nauseam.

This moral selectivity of those who speak most loudly about morality in foreign policy is commonly regarded as some kind of logical error or personal idiosyncracy. But it is nothing of the sort. It is an attempt to restate the defining principles of the political philosophy underlying our liberal democracy. To the degree that we subscribe to the restatement we accept a new definition that affirms a neo-socialist version of the good political community, as distinct from our traditional democratic capitalist version.

That is why, for instance, the controversy over America's relations with the so-called Third World is so important. It serves as a very convenient fulcrum for swinging public opinion over to the "liberal" conception of our political ideals. It is no accident, after all, that so many "liberal" prescriptions for a "new international economic order" involve our changing our habitual mode of doing business (the "capitalist" mode) so as to accommodate ourselves to *their* way of doing business (the "socialist" mode). And if one dares to suggest that we would all be better off if

that procedure were reversed, one finds oneself accused of a callous disregard of American ideals.

The reason this kind of selective moralism is so effective is that it can draw easily on the diffuse moralism that characterizes our traditional, simplistic way of thinking and talking about foreign affairs in general. We shall never be able to challenge the one—as, in my opinion, it should be challenged—until we have revised the other. After all, one can hardly hope to understand one's own values until one has learned to be sensible about them.

Limits of the Human Rights Standard

ERNEST W. LEFEVER

A consistent and single-minded invocation of the "human rights standard" in making United States foreign policy decisions would serve neither our interests nor the cause of freedom. We believe our government should uphold the full range of human rights and that peoples everywhere should enjoy them. With freedom under siege throughout the world, we should by precept and example continue to hold high the torch of human dignity, but ironically the "human rights standard" is a singularly confusing guideline for responsible statecraft. It has become chic to talk of morality and foreign policy, but there is little awareness of the pitfalls in these noble words. Making human rights the chief, or even major, foreign policy determinant carries dangers.

1. Giving human rights a central place subordinates, blurs, or distorts all other relevant considerations. After all, the central objectives of our foreign policy are security and peace. In strategic terms, we seek to deter nuclear war and blackmail. In the

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Third World we seek interstate stability, which is conducive to peaceful development and normal diplomatic and economic intercourse among states.

2. Advocates of the "human rights standard" fail to appreciate the legal and practical limits of foreign policy. International law forbids any state from interfering in the internal political, judicial, and economic affairs of another. Fundamentally, the quality of life in a political community should be determined by its own people, but outsiders should urge governments that adhere to international rights covenants to honor their obligations.

3. The advocacy of human rights in other states, supported by policies of denial or punishment, leads to a kind of reform intervention that we rightly detest when others do it. We have no moral mandate to remake the world in our own image. It is arrogant to attempt to reform the domestic behavior of our allies or our adversaries.

But we have a right and obligation to attempt to alter their external policies that threaten the peace. Economic and military aid should be given or withheld to encourage sound external policies, but not to reform domestic institutions or practices, however obnoxious. When domestic practices have a significant and adverse impact on external affairs, the United States has a right to respond.

4. The "human rights standard" is often unequally applied and sometimes used as a cloak for attacking anti-Communist allies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Greece (under the colonels), Brazil, and post-Allende Chile. Some critics have urged the end of normal economic or military relations with these countries, each of which has been a target of Communist invasion, subversion, or sustained pressure. True, their citizens do not enjoy the rights we enjoy. Equally true, they have far more freedom than their Communist adversaries.

Chile provides a good example. Under Salvador Allende Gossens, Chile was subjected to a massive effort by Havana and Moscow to transform it into a totalitarian state. This was prevented by a military coup that installed an authoritarian regime that restricts human rights and now holds perhaps several dozen political prisoners. The World Bank has found Chile creditworthy for a loan. The "human rights" advocates have opposed this loan, but some of them strongly support normalization of

relations with Cuba, which has thousands of political prisoners and denies many basic rights.

If these advocates prevailed, we would be punishing an authoritarian ally that is pursuing a responsible foreign policy and rewarding a totalitarian adversary that has an expeditionary force of 20,000 men in Angola to maintain a minority regime in power.

My aim is not to praise Chile or condemn Cuba but to underline the futility and irresponsibility of the "human rights standard." If we gave billions in lend-lease to Stalin in the war against Hitler, perhaps it is not entirely wrong to sell military equipment to Iran to help it withstand Soviet pressure.

This points to the centrality of the national interest as the enduring guide to foreign policy decisions. Defined broadly enough to embrace our security needs and the legitimate interests of other states, the national interest takes into account all other factors that bear upon the complex calculus of statesmanship.

Pursuing the national interest so defined, there will be occasional opportunities for our government to nudge history in a more humane and less brutal direction. But every day we Americans can make our own contribution to human freedom by insisting that our own rights be fully respected by our own leaders.

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ISBN 0-89633-005-2